The Sydney Institute

Statement

by

Ambassador Idriss Jazaïry

Permanent Representative of Algeria

to the United Nations Office in Geneva

15 August 2011

Mr. Executive Director

Distinguished Members of the Sydney Institute

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen

I am delighted to have been given the opportunity to address you on the theme of   “The winds of political and socio-economic change in the Arab region” at the kind invitation of the Sydney Institute.

In this presentation I will endeavourfirst to address the genesis of this political phenomenon sweeping across the region. I will secondly underline the diverse nature of it manifestations and caution therefore against one-size-fits-all analyses thereof. Change is always disruptive but while often street triggered it can be either street driven or institution driven. I will therefore provide in the third place as a case study the managed change now occurring in Algeria. Finally I will be reviewing how best the international community can respond to the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the region to reforms towards more democracy and empowerment.   

First on the genesis of the political phenomenon, Arabs and other developing countries who freed themselves from colonial occupation in the 2^nd half of the past century have tended to resort to centralisedpolitical systems in their nation-building efforts.

The endogenous causes for this shared feature was the belief that only such centralisedapproach can reduce the vulnerability of new States intent on giving substance to their recently acquired status as independent entities. Their main goal was to consolidate, through centralisation,their national unity over tribal or clan allegiances that had been exacerbated by the divide-and-rule-policies of the former colonial power.

Another key objective was to translate political independence into economic sovereignty including through clawing back control over their natural resources.   Thus the Arab region resorted to the centralisationof State power to allow its decision-makers to spearhead sweeping reforms required at the Nation-building stage. The problem arose when centralisation remained the preferred management style of decision-makers beyond this stage.

Resorting to centralisation beyond its use-by date transformed it from an instrument of reform to a brake thereto, leading to stagnation.

In many instances the hands-on intervention of the State was also as much to bear the brunt by default as by design, in the absence of a broad based educated and trained citizenry.

Hence regardless of the political systems of Arab States, as republics espousing socialism or as monarchies, centralised State power, from the era of independence of the ‘sixties to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, was widely considered as providing the answer.  

Exogenous factors further compounded this trend: As a carry-over from the Cold War and having in mind the strategic value of countries of the Arab region, competing major powers maintained with many of them client-relations which were predicated on personalised partnerships with centralising or over-powering leaders receiving outside political patronage as a counterpart for their cooperative stance.

The Middle East agenda relayed the Cold War in fostering this kind of partnership between major powers and some national leaders responsive to their concerns. These factors were also conducive to the centralised exercise of power.

The problem, or should I say the solution here, arose when the Arab people concerned rose in unison to remind all partners that legitimacy of leadership is confirmed by the ballot box and not by anointment of foreign power patronage.

This over-centralisation of power in the Arab region has generated tensions exacerbated by contemporary world evolution and local factors thus building up to breaking point and leading to current political tectonic shifts in the region.

Contemporary world evolution encompasses the playing out of globalisation, with attendant increases in discrepancies of income, the revolution in ITC’s and social networking and the increased volatility of the prices of basic foodstuffs. This evolution has adversely affected the vulnerable populations of the Arab region, specially the unemployed youth. But it has also given them the possibility to express their rage collectively and publicly.   

Among local factors leading to the current shift beyond tipping point, one stands out. It has to do with the descent from over-centralisation to autocracy. This is exemplified by the low rate of rotation in the political leadership at the top echelon overall, causing a disconnect with the people. Over the past half century only Lebanon and Algeria have reached a turnover of 10 or more Heads of State.

Another factor is the recognition that the ideological package of the Arab Nation-State has not delivered on its promises, nor has the “Islam is the answer” slogan of fundamentalist groups. The tipping point was reached when the youth took to the streets. In the Arab region, as in many parts of Africa, 60% of the population is under 25 years of age and first-job seekers, in particular university graduates, have difficulty in finding employment. The rate of unemployment in their midst is typically much higher than the overall rate prevailing in the area.

Normally having a young working age population is an asset. However for this to happen, rates of output growth much higher than the current 4.5% rate in the region are required. While supportive of the on-going change under way on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, the countries on its Northern shores despite their high ratio of retired-to-active population, have made the situation worse by further tightening labour immigration controls from countries across the Mediterranean undergoing change.            

Thus youth-led riots resonated across the Arab region causing this tectonic shift now playing itself out in different forms of expression from one Arab country to the other in light of local circumstances.

This brings me to my second point about the diverse nature of the process of change under way in the Arab world.

Change is to be welcomed as it responds to the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the Arab region for reform. As the ultimate depositaries of sovereignty, the peoples of the Arab world are entitled to make their common aspirations prevail and Governments have the duty to respond thereto.

Where the political leadership has been responsive, dialogue has taken place with political parties and with civil society and especially with the youth to define the desired outcome in terms of enhancement of democracy and well-being. A review of the Constitutional as well as of the legal framework is being agreed upon with a view to achieving agreed outcomes. When this scenario prevails, there is a clarity on objectives and processes. Disruptions are minimized and outcome can be reached sooner rather than later and is likely to conform with expectations.

Where, on the other hand, response to the people’s claims has been delayed or where these claims have been denied, frustration exploded replacing peaceful demonstrations by “street law”, vigilantes… Violence breaks out on all sides. Instances of civil war even occur. This is undermining the very Nation-State which was the major achievement of the political leadership of these countries in the second half of 20^th century. Claims by the population evolve from reforms to regime change, further polarizing the situation. In this scenario, change comes at a high cost for the people in terms of human rights violation, instability and joblessness.

The more violent the process of change, the longer and the more disruptive it is likely to be and the more uncertain will be its outcome.

Hence the fallacy of denying the specificity of situations prevailing in different Arab countries by referring to an “Arab spring” or to a “Domino Effect theory” for regime change in the region. These are headline slogans, not helpful scientific tools.  Different countries are at different political seasons, as it were.

In any event, in purely climatological terms, spring is short or inexistent in the latitudes of the Arab expanse of territory. As for the “Domino Effect theory” it has empirically not been borne out and may to some degree be politically motivated wishful thinking.

Change is indeed overdue in the Arab region and it can best be achieved when it is possible for the transition to be managed peacefully through dialogue and consensus-building.

This leads me to my third point referring to the change process under way in Algeria which purports to do exactly this. Change introducing democratic liberalization occurred in Algeria in 1988 after some 26 years of nation-building centralism. It was a response to the broad-based youth, and specially student, demonstrations. Soon after, multipartyism was hijacked by advocates of the “one man, one vote, one time” version of democracy. After the toll of the “Dark Decade” which ensued and with the achievement of National Reconciliation, the State of Emergency was ended in Algeria during the first quarter of 2011.

There are 30 political parties operating in Algeria and over 50 newspapers expressing their views freely and criticizing Government as they please without being subject to any taboos.

The president of Algeria, H. E. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, announced in April 2011 the presentation of a bill to Parliament which will include the depenalization of press offences. 

In a seminal speech delivered on 15 April 2011, the President recognized the legitimacy of “the aspirations of all peoples and specially the youth for social and economic betterment and for more justice and freedom and even more for good governance”. He launched a series of reforms “to enhance the democratic process, reinforce the rule of law, reduce disparities and accelerate economic development”. The purpose of the reforms is to further empower citizens and foster closer interaction between the latter and the authorities.

Amendments to the Constitution and to the law on elections will be introduced with the aim of aligning the Algerian electoral system with the most advanced norms of representative democracy. Supervision of elections by international observers will be provided. Likewise amendments will be initiated to the law on political parties to empower the latter to participate more effectively in this democratic renewal.

Also announced by the President is a review of the Code of local government to enhance the role of local elected assemblies and a law to rehabilitate the role of NGOs in society. This will provide specific guarantees to enable national human rights NGOs to make themselves heard and pursue their tasks under optimal conditions.

The Algerian change process under way may thus provide a template for peaceful democratic transition in the Arab region and beyond.

This brings me to my last point as to how best the international community can be involved in the change process under way in the Arab region.

It behoves the international community to accompany and backstop efforts by Arab States to respond to the aspirations of their people. In case of lack of State responsiveness leading to the outbreak of violence and human rights violations, the international partners should be guided by the position taken by regional Organisations of which the Arab country is a member. If the said country is a member of two regional Organisations e.g. the Arab League and the African Union, the most prudent option would be to seek a course of action which would give equal weight to the positions of both, should they differ.

When underpinning the State’s efforts to respond to the people’s will did not allow change to occur peacefully and when the human rights situation became unacceptable, the UN has resorted first to “soft power”.

This has taken the form of “condemnation of the use of force against citizens by the Syrian Authorities” and of a call for accountability of perpetrators, in an agreed statement by the President of the Security Council released on 3 August 2011.                 

Various resolutions adopted previously by the Human Rights Council on Syria (S/16/1 of 29 April 2011) as well as Libya (S/15/1 of 15 February 2011) can also be categorized as “soft power”.

The UN resorted to “hard power” by Security Council resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, imposing a multifaceted embargo on the Government and senior political leadership of Libya. When the Arab League adopted its decision of 12 March 2011 advocating a no-fly zone over Libya against the Libyan air force, the Security Council found justification to adopt its resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011. In it, the Council called for effectively putting in force this option entrusting the responsibility of enforcement to individual member States or to their regional groupings.

The implementation of resolution 1973 empowering Member States and their groupings also to take “all necessary measures” to protect the civilian population, has been challenged by permanent members of the Security Council themselves. There was disagreement on the inclusion in this concept of ground attacks by NATO air forces in addition to enforcement of the no-fly zone.  

Much has been said about resolution 1973 as being the first concrete expression of the “Responsibility to protect”. However, the way in which it is being applied including through resort to disproportionate use of force is now being questioned more broadly.    

Answering a journalist who asked him whether R2P was being applied in Libya, Cornelio Somarruga, the former president of the ICRC was quoted by “Le Temps” of 13 July 2011 as saying:

“The answer is no. I would even say that the intervention in Libya may have killed this concept adopted by the UN in 2005”

Be that as it may, it is unlikely that the form taken by this military intervention will expedite the requisite outcome in terms of minimizing losses of human lives and destruction of socio-economic infrastructure.

Algeria which welcomed the advent of a new era in Tunisia and Egypt has declared that the situation in Libya and Syria was unacceptable. In Libya, it has not ceased to advocate dialogue between the contending parties to preserve stability and national unity and end violence. Algeria was subsequently the subject of politically motivated slanderous attacks for not taking sides in the conflict in Libya.

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In conclusion we feel that Arabs should be in the driver’s seat where political change is concerned. Believing in democracy means that we must recognize that the legitimacy of their state leaders and of regime change result from decisions to be taken by none other than their citizens, solely through the ballot box. Outside partners must limit themselves in this regard to assisting in holding fair and transparent elections as soon as possible for this to happen.

The winds of change in the Arab region may blow yet for a long time. But they should not obscure the immediate issue of the Arab people of Palestine whose sufferings under occupation are the worst of all. Let us not forget that part of the rage of youths that marched in the streets of the Mashrek was due to the perceived inability of their Governments and of the Arab League to break the logjam of what can hardly still be called a “Peace process”.